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Abstract
Distributed dynamic gossip is a generalization of the classic telephone problem
in which agents communicate to share secrets, with the additional twist that also
telephone numbers are exchanged to determine who can call whom. Recent work
focused on the success conditions of simple protocols such as “Learn New Secrets”
(LNS) wherein an agent a may only call another agent b if a does not know b’s
secret. A protocol execution is successful if all agents get to know all secrets. On
partial networks these protocols sometimes fail because they ignore information
available to the agents that would allow for better coordination. We study how
epistemic protocols for dynamic gossip can be strengthened, using epistemic
logic as a simple protocol language with a new operator for protocol-dependent
knowledge. We provide definitions of different strengthenings and show that
they perform better than LNS , but we also prove that there is no strengthening
of LNS that always terminates successfully. Together, this gives us a better
picture of when and how epistemic coordination can help in the dynamic gossip
problem in particular and distributed systems in general.
This work is based on chapter 6 entitled “Dynamic Gossip” of Malvin Gattinger’s PhD thesis [19].
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1 Introduction
The so-called gossip problem is a problem about peer-to-peer information sharing:
a number of agents each start with some private information, and the goal is to
share this information among all agents, using only peer-to-peer communication
channels [38]. For example, the agents could be autonomous sensors that need to
pool their individual measurements in order to obtain a joint observation. Or the
agents could be distributed copies of a database that can each be edited separately,
and that need to synchronize with each other [18, 21, 28].
The example that is typically used in the literature, however, is a bit more
frivolous: as the name suggests, the gossip problem is usually represented as a
number of people gossiping [24, 16, 15]. This term goes back to the oldest sources
on the topic, such as [6]. The gossip scenario gives us not only the name of the
gossip problem, but also the names of some of the other concepts that are used:
the private information that an agent starts out with is called that agent’s secret,
the communication between two agents is called a telephone call and an agent a is
capable of contacting another agent b if a knows b’s telephone number.
These terms should not be taken too literally. Results on the gossip problem can,
in theory, be used by people that literally just want to exchange gossip by telephone.
But we model information exchange in general and ignore all other social and fun
aspects of gossip among humans — although these aspects can also be modeled in
epistemic logic [30].
For our framework, applications where artificial agents need to synchronize
their information are much more likely. For example, recent ideas to improve
cryptocurrencies like bitcoin and other blockchain applications focus on the peer-
to-peer exchange (gossip) happening in such networks [36] or even aim to replace
blockchains with directed graphs storing the history of communication [5]. Epistemic
logic can shed new light on the knowledge of agents participating in blockchain
protocols [22, 10].
There are many different sets of rules for the gossip problem [24]. For example,
calls may be one-on-one, or may be conference calls. Multiple calls may take place in
parallel, or must happen sequentially. Agents may only be allowed to exchange one
secret per call, or exchange everything they know. Information may go both ways
during a call, or only in one direction. We consider only the most commonly studied
set of rules: calls are one-on-one, calls are sequential, and the callers exchange all
the secrets they know. So if a call between a and b is followed by a call between b
and c, then in the second call agent b will also tell agent c the secret of agent a.
The goal of gossip is that every agent knows every secret. An agent who knows
all secrets is called an expert, so the goal is to turn all agents into experts.
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The classical gossip problem, studied in the 1970s, assumed a total communication
network (anyone could call anyone else from the start), and focused on optimal call
sequences, i.e. schedules of calls which spread all the secrets with a minimum number
of calls, which happens to be 2n − 4 for n ≥ 4 agents [38, 27]. Later, this strong
assumption on the network of the gossiping agents was dropped, giving rise to studies
on different network topologies (see [24] for a survey), with 2n− 3 calls sufficing for
most networks.
Unfortunately, these results about optimal call sequences only show that such
call sequences exist. They do not provide any guidance to the agents about how
to achieve an optimal call sequence. Effectively, these solutions assume a central
scheduler with knowledge of the entire network, who will come up with an optimal
schedule of calls, to be sent to the agents, who will eventually execute it in the correct
order. Most results also rely upon synchrony so that agents can execute their calls
at the appropriate time (i.e. after some calls have been made, and before some other
calls are made).
The requirement that there be a central scheduler that tells the agents exactly
what to do, is against the spirit of the peer-to-peer communication that we want to
achieve. Computer science has shifted towards the study of distributed algorithms for
the gossip problem [23, 29]. Indeed, the gossip problem becomes more natural without
a central scheduler; the gossiping agents try to do their best with the information
they have when deciding whom to call. Unfortunately, this can lead to sequences of
calls that are redundant because they contain many calls that are uninformative in
the sense that neither agent learns a new secret. Additionally, the algorithm may
fail, i.e., it may deadlock, get stuck in a loop or terminate before all information has
been exchanged.
For many applications it is not realistic to assume that every agent is capable of
contacting every other agent. So we assume that every agent has a set of agents of
which they “know the telephone number”, their neighbors, so to say, and that they
are therefore able to contact. We represent this as a directed graph, with an edge
from agent a to agent b if a is capable of calling b.
In classical studies, this graph is typically considered to be unchanging. In more
recent work on dynamic gossip the agents exchange both the secrets and the numbers
of their contacts, therefore increasing the connectivity of the network [16]. We focus
on dynamic gossip. In distributed protocols for dynamic gossip all agents decide
on their own whom to call, depending on their current information [16], or also
depending on the expectation for knowledge growth resulting from the call [15]. The
latter requires agents to represent each other’s knowledge, and thus epistemic logic.
Different protocols for dynamic gossip are successful in different classes of gossip
networks. The main challenge in designing such a protocol is to find a good level of
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redundancy: we do not want superfluous calls, but the less redundant a gossip protocol,
the easier it fails in particular networks. Another challenge is to keep the protocol
simple. After all, a protocol that requires the agents to solve a computationally
hard problem every time they have to decide whom to call next, would not be
practical. There is also a trade-off between the content of the message of which a
call consists, and the expected duration of gossip protocols. A nice example of that
is [25], wherein the minimum number of calls to achieve the epistemic goal is reduced
from quadratic to linear order, however at the price of more ‘expensive’ messages,
not only exchanging secrets but also knowledge about secrets.
A well-studied protocol is “Learn New Secrets” (LNS), in which agents are allowed
to call someone if and only if they do not know the other’s secret. This protocol
excludes redundant calls in which neither participant learns any new secrets. As
a result of this property, all LNS call sequences are finite. For small numbers of
agents, it therefore has a shorter expected execution length than the “Any Call”
(ANY ) protocol that allows arbitrary calls at all times and thus allows infinite call
sequences [14]. Additionally, it is easy for agents to check whom they are allowed to
call when following LNS . However, LNS is not always successful. On some graphs it
can terminate unsuccessfully, i.e. when some agents do not yet know all secrets. In
particular there are graphs where the outcome depends on how the agents choose
among allowed calls [16].
Fortunately, it turns out that failure of LNS can often be avoided with some
forethought by the calling agents. That is, if some of the choices available to the
agents lead to success and other choices to failure, it is often possible for the agents
to determine in advance which choices are the successful ones. This leads to the
idea of strengthening a protocol. Suppose that P is a protocol that, depending on
the choices of the agents, is sometimes successful and sometimes unsuccessful. A
strengthening of P is an addition to P that gives the agents guidance on how to
choose among the options that P gives them.
The idea is that such a strengthening can leave good properties of a protocol
intact, while reducing the chance of failure. For example, any strengthening of LNS
will inherit the property that there are no redundant calls: It will still be the case
that agents only call other agents if they do not know their secrets.
Let us illustrate this with a small example, also featuring as a running example
in the technical sections (see Figure 1 on page 169). There are three agents a, b, c.
Agent a knows the number of b, and b and c know each other’s number. Calling
agents exchange secrets and numbers, which may expand the network, and they
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apply the LNS protocol, wherein you may only call other agents if you do not know
their secret. If a calls b, it learns the secret of b and the number of c. All different
ways to make further calls now result in all three agents knowing all secrets. If the
first call is between b and c (and there are no other first calls than ab, bc, and cb),
they learn each other’s secret but no new number. The only possible next call now is
ab, after which a and b know all secrets but not c. But although a now knows c’s
number, she is not permitted to call c, as she already learned c’s secret by calling b.
We are stuck. So, some executions of LNS on this graph are successful and others
are unsuccessful. Suppose we now strengthen the LNS protocol into LNS ′ such that
b and c have to wait before making a call until they are called by another agent.
This means that b will first receive a call from a. Then all executions of LNS ′ are
successful on this graph. In fact, there is only one remaining execution: ab; bc; ac.
The protocol LNS ′ is a strengthening of the protocol LNS .
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We define what it means that
a gossip protocol is common knowledge between all agents. To that end we propose
a logical semantics with an individual knowledge modality for protocol-dependent
knowledge. We then define various strengthenings of gossip protocols, both in the
logical syntax and in the semantics. This includes a strengthening called uniform
backward induction, a form of backward induction applied to (imperfect information)
gossip protocol execution trees. We give some general results for strengthenings,
but mainly apply our strengthenings to the protocol LNS : we investigate some
basic gossip graphs (networks) on which we gradually strengthen LNS until all its
executions are successful on that graph. However, no such strengthening will work
for all gossip graphs. This is proved by a counterexample consisting of a six-agent
gossip graph, that requires fairly detailed analysis. Some of our results involve the
calculation and checking of large numbers of call sequences. For this we use an
implementation in Haskell.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic definitions
to describe gossip graphs and a variant of epistemic logic to be interpreted on
them. In particular, Subsection 2.3 introduces a new operator for protocol-dependent
knowledge. In Section 3 we define semantic and — using the new operator —
syntactic ways to strengthen gossip protocols. We investigate how successful those
strengthenings are and study their behavior under iteration. Section 4 contains our
main result, that strengthening LNS to a strongly successful protocol is impossible.
In Section 5 we wrap up and conclude. The Appendix describes the Haskell code
used to support our results.
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2 Epistemic Logic for Dynamic Gossip Protocols
2.1 Gossip Graphs and Calls
Gossip graphs are used to keep track of who knows which secrets and which telephone
numbers.
Definition 1 (Gossip Graph). Given a finite set of agents A, a gossip graph G is
a triple (A,N, S) where N and S are binary relations on A such that I ⊆ S ⊆ N
where I is the identity relation on A. An initial gossip graph is a gossip graph where
S = I. We write Nab for (a, b) ∈ N and Na for {b ∈ A | Nab}, and similarly for the
relation S. The set of all initial gossip graphs is denoted by G.
The relations model the basic knowledge of the agents. Agent a knows the number
of b iff Nab and a knows the secret of b iff Sab. If we have Nab and not Sab we also
say that a knows the pure number of b.
Definition 2 (Possible Call; Call Execution). A call is an ordered pair of agents
(a, b) ∈ A×A. We usually write ab instead of (a, b). Given a gossip graph G, a call
ab is possible iff Nab. Given a possible call ab, Gab is the graph (A′, N ′, S′) such
that A′ := A, N ′a := N ′b := Na ∪Nb, S′a := S′b := Sa ∪ Sb, and N ′c := Nc, S′c := Sc for
c 6= a, b. For a sequence of calls ab; cd; . . . we write σ or τ . The empty sequence is .
A sequence of possible calls is a possible call sequence. We extend the notation Gab
to possible call sequences by G := G and Gσ;ab := (Gσ)ab. Gossip graph Gσ is the
result of executing σ in G.
To visualize gossip graphs we draw N with dashed and S with solid arrows. When
making calls, the property S ⊆ N is preserved, so we omit the dashed N arrow if
there already is a solid S arrow.
Example 3. Consider the following initial gossip graph G in which a knows the
number of b, and b and c know each other’s number and no other numbers are known:
a b c
Suppose that a calls b. We obtain the gossip graph Gab in which a and b know each
other’s secret and a now also knows the number of c:
a b c
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2.2 Logical Language and Protocols
We now introduce a logical language which we will interpret on gossip graphs.
Propositional variables Nab and Sab stand for “agent a knows the number of agent b”
and “agent a knows the secret of agent b”, and > is the ‘always true’ proposition.
Definitions 4 and 5 are by simultaneous induction, as the language construct KPa ϕ
refers to a protocol P .
Definition 4 (Language). We consider the language L defined by
ϕ ::= > | Nab | Sab | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | KPa ϕ | [pi]ϕ
pi ::= ?ϕ | ab | (pi ; pi) | (pi ∪ pi) | pi∗
where a, b ∈ A. Members of L of type ϕ are formulas and those of type pi are
programs.
Definition 5 (Syntactic protocol). A syntactic protocol P is a program defined by
P :=
 ⋃
a6=b∈A
(?(Nab ∧ Pab); ab)
∗; ? ∧
a6=b∈A
¬ (Nab ∧ Pab)
where for all a 6= b ∈ A, Pab ∈ L is a formula. This formula is called the protocol
condition for call ab of protocol P . The notation Pab means that a and b are
designated variables in that formula.
Other logical connectives and program constructs are defined by abbreviation.
Moreover, Nabcd stands for Nab ∧ Nac ∧ Nad, and NaB for ∧b∈B Nab. We use
analogous abbreviations for the relation S. We write Exa for SaA. We then say
that agent a is an expert. Similarly, we write ExB for
∧
b∈B Exb, and Ex for ExA: all
agents are experts.
Construct [pi]ϕ reads as “after every execution of program pi, ϕ (is true).” For
program modalities, we use the standard definition for diamonds: 〈pi〉ϕ := ¬[pi]¬ϕ,
and further: pi0 := ?> and for all n ∈ N, pin := pin−1;pi.
Our protocols are gossip protocols, but as we define no other, we omit the word
‘gossip’. The word ‘syntactic’ in syntactic protocol is to distinguish it from the
semantic protocol that will be defined later. It is also often omitted.
Our new operator KPa ϕ reads as “given the protocol P , agent a knows that
ϕ”. Informally, this means that agent a knows that ϕ on the assumption that it is
common knowledge among the agents that they all use the gossip protocol P . The
epistemic dual is defined as KˆPa ϕ := ¬KPa ¬ϕ and can be read as “given the protocol
P , agent a considers it possible that ϕ.”
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We note that the language is well-defined, in particular KPa . The only variable
parts of a protocol P are the protocol conditions Pab. Hence, given |A| agents, and
the requirement that a 6= b, a protocol is determined by its |A| · (|A| − 1) many
protocol conditions. We can therefore see the construct KPa ϕ as an operator with
input (|A| · (|A| − 1))+ 1 objects of type formula (namely all these protocol condition
formulas plus the formula ϕ in KPa ϕ), and as output a more complex object of type
formula (namely KPa ϕ).1
Note that this means that all knowledge operators in a call condition Pab of
a protocol P must be relative to protocols strictly simpler than P . In particular,
the call condition Pab cannot contain the operator KPa , although it may contain
KP
′
a where P ′ is less complex than P . So the language is incapable of describing
the “protocol” X given by “a is allowed to call b if and only if a knows, assuming
that X is common knowledge, that b does not know a’s secret.” This is intentional;
the “protocol” X is viciously circular so we do not want our language to be able to
represent it.
Example 6. The “Learn New Secrets” protocol (LNS) is the protocol with protocol
conditions ¬Sab for all a 6= b ∈ A. This prescribes that you are allowed to call
any agent whose secret you do not yet know (and whose number you already know).
The “Any Call” protocol (ANY ) is the protocol with protocol conditions > for all
a 6= b ∈ A. You are allowed to call any agent whose number you know.
The standard epistemic modality is defined by abbreviation as Kaϕ := KANYa ϕ.
2.3 Semantics of Protocol-Dependent Knowledge
We now define how to interpret the language L on gossip graphs. A gossip state is a
pair (G, σ) such that G is an initial gossip graph and σ a call sequence possible on
G (see Def. 2). We recall that G and σ induce the gossip graph Gσ = (A,Nσ, Sσ).
This is called the gossip graph associated with gossip state (G, σ). The semantics of
L is with respect to a given initial gossip graph G, and defined on the set of gossip
states (G, σ) for all σ possible on G. Definitions 7 and 8 are simultaneously defined.
Definition 7 (Epistemic Relation). Let an initial gossip graph G = (A,N, S) and
a protocol P be given. We inductively define the epistemic relation ∼Pa for agent a
over gossip states (G, σ), where Gσ = (A,Nσ, Sσ) are the associated gossip graphs.
1Alternatively one could define a protocol condition function f : A2 → L and proceed as follows.
In the language BNF replace KPa ϕ by Ka( ~ϕab, ϕ) where a 6= b and ~ϕab is a vector representing
|A| · (|A| − 1) arguments, and in the definition of protocol replace Pab by f(a, b). That way,
Definition 4 precedes Definition 5 and is no longer simultaneously defined. Then, when later defining
the semantics of Ka( ~ϕab, ϕ), replace all ϕab by f(a, b).
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1. (G, ) ∼Pa (G, );
2. if (G, σ) ∼Pa (G, τ), Nσb = N τb , Sσb = Sτb , and ab is P -permitted at (G, σ) and
at (G, τ), then (G, σ; ab) ∼Pa (G, τ ; ab);
if (G, σ) ∼Pa (G, τ), Nσb = N τb , Sσb = Sτb , and ba is P -permitted at (G, σ) and
at (G, τ), then (G, σ; ba) ∼Pa (G, τ ; ba);
3. if (G, σ) ∼Pa (G, τ) and c, d, e, f 6= a such that cd is P -permitted at (G, σ) and
ef is P -permitted at (G, τ), then (G, σ; cd) ∼Pa (G, τ ; ef).
Definition 8 (Semantics). Let initial gossip graph G = (A,N, S) be given. We
inductively define the interpretation of a formula ϕ ∈ L on a gossip state (G, σ),
where Gσ = (A,Nσ, Sσ) is the associated gossip graph.
G, σ |= > always
G, σ |= Nab iff Nσa b
G, σ |= Sab iff Sσa b
G, σ |= ¬ϕ iff G, σ 6|= ϕ
G, σ |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff G, σ |= ϕ and G, σ |= ψ
G, σ |= KPa ϕ iff G, σ′ |= ϕ for all (G, σ′) ∼Pa (G, σ)
G, σ |= [pi]ϕ iff G, σ′ |= ϕ for all (G, σ′) ∈ JpiK(G, σ)
where J·K is the following interpretation of programs as relations between gossip states.
Note that we write JpiK(G, σ) for the set {(G, σ′) | ((G, σ), (G, σ′)) ∈ JpiK}.
J?ϕK(G, σ) := {(G, σ) | G, σ |= ϕ}JabK(G, σ) := {(G, (σ; ab)) | G, σ |= Nab}Jpi;pi′K(G, σ) := ⋃{Jpi′K(G, σ′) | (G, σ′) ∈ JpiK(G, σ)}Jpi ∪ pi′K(G, σ) := JpiK(G, σ) ∪ Jpi′K(G, σ)Jpi∗K(G, σ) := ⋃{JpinK(G, σ) | n ∈ N}
If G, σ |= Pab we say that ab is P -permitted at (G, σ). A P -permitted call sequence
consists of P -permitted calls.
Let us first explain why the interpretation of protocol-dependent knowledge is
well-defined. The interpretation of KPa ϕ in state (G, σ) is a function of the truth
of ϕ in all (G, τ) accessible via ∼Pa . This is standard. Non-standard is that the
relation ∼Pa is a function of the truth of protocol conditions Pab in gossip states
including (G, σ). This may seem a slippery slope. However, note that KPa ϕ cannot
be a subformula of any such Pab, as the language L is well-defined: knowledge cannot
be self-referential. These checks of Pab can therefore be performed without vicious
circularity.
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Let us now explain an important property of ∼Pa , namely that it only relates
two gossip states if both are reachable by the protocol P . So if (G, σ) ∼Pa (G, σ′)
and σ is a P -permitted call sequence, then σ′ is P -permitted as well. In other
words, a assumes that no one will make any calls that are not P -permitted. The
set {∼Pa | a ∈ A} of relations therefore represents the information state of the agents
under the assumption that it is common knowledge that the protocol P will be
followed.
Given the logical semantics, a convenient primitive is the following gossip model.
Definition 9 (Gossip Model; Execution Tree). Given an initial gossip graph G, the
gossip model for G consists of all gossip states (G, σ) (where, by definition of gossip
states, σ is possible on G), with epistemic relations ∼Pa between gossip states. The
execution tree of a protocol P given G is the submodel of the gossip model restricted
to the set of those (G, σ) where σ is P -permitted.
The relation ∼Pa is an equivalence relation on the restriction of a gossip model
to the set of gossip states (G, σ) where σ is P -permitted. This is why we use the
symbol ∼ for the relation. However, ∼Pa is typically not an equivalence relation on
the entire domain of the gossip model, as ∼Pa is not reflexive on unreachable gossip
states (G, σ).
In our semantics, the modality [ab] can always be evaluated. There are three cases
to distinguish. (i) If the call ab is not possible (if a does not know the number of b),
then JabK(G, σ) = ∅, so that [ab]ϕ is trivially true for all ϕ. (ii) If the call ab is possible
but not P -permitted, then JabK(G, σ) = {(G, σ; ab)} but ∼Pa (G, σ; ab) = ∅, so that
in such states KPa ⊥ is true: the agent believes everything including contradictions.
In other words, we have that ¬Pab → [ab]KPc ⊥. (iii) If the call ab is possible and
P -permitted, then JabK(G, σ) = {(G, σ; ab)} and ∼Pa (G, σ; ab) 6= ∅ consists of the
equivalence class of gossip states that are indistinguishable for agent a after call ab.
In view of the above, one might want to have a modality or program strictly
standing for ‘call ab is possible and P -permitted’. We can enforce protocol P for call
ab by [?Pab; ab]ϕ, for “after the P -permitted call ab, ϕ is true.”
Let us now be exact in what sense the gossip model is a Kripke model. Clear
enough, the set of gossip states (G, σ) constitute a domain, and we can identify
the valuation of atomic propositions Nab (resp. Sab) with the subset of the domain
such that (G, σ) |= Nab (resp. (G, σ) |= Sab). The relation to the usual accessibility
relations of a Kripke model is less clear. For each agent a, we do not have a unique
relation ∼a, but parametrized relations ∼Pa ; therefore, in a way, there are as many
relations for agent a as there are protocols P . These relations ∼Pa are only implicitly
given. Given P , they can be made explicit if a semantic check of KPa ϕ so requires.
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Gossip models are reminiscent of the history-based models of [34] and of the
protocol-generated forest of [9]. A gossip model is a protocol-generated forest (and
similarly, the execution trees contained in the gossip model are protocol-generated
forests), although a rather small forest, namely consisting of a single tree. An
important consequence of this is that the agents initially have common knowledge
of the gossip graph. For example, in the initial gossip graph of the introduction,
depicted in Figure 1, agent a knows that agent c only knows the number of b. Other
works consider uncertainty about the initial gossip graph (for example, to represent
that agent a is uncertain whether c knows a’s number), such that each gossip graph
initially considered possible generates its own tree [15].
The gossip states (G, σ) that are the domain elements of the gossip model carry
along a history of prior calls. This can, in principle, be used in a protocol language to
be interpreted on such models, although we do not do this in this work. An example
of such a protocol is the “Call Once” protocol described in [16]: call ab is permitted
in gossip state (G, σ), if ab and ba do not occur in σ.
With respect to the protocol ANY the gossip model is not restricted. If we
only were to consider the protocol ANY , to each agent we can associate a unique
epistemic relation ∼ANYa in the gossip model, for which we might as well write ∼a.
We now have a standard Kripke model. This justifies Kaϕ as a suitable abbreviation
of KANYa ϕ.
Definition 10 (Extension of a protocol). For any initial gossip graph G and any
syntactic protocol P we define the extension of P on G by
P0(G) := {}
Pi+1(G) := {σ; ab | σ ∈ Pi(G), a, b ∈ A, G, σ |= Pab}
P (G) := ⋃i<ω Pk(G)
The extension of P is {(G,P (G)) | G ∈ G}.
Recall that G is the set of all initial gossip graphs. We often identify a protocol
with its extension. To compare protocols we will write P ⊆ P ′ iff for all G ∈ G we
have P (G) ⊆ P ′(G).
Definition 11 (Success). Given an initial gossip graph G and protocol P , a P -
permitted call sequence σ is terminal iff for all calls ab, G, σ 6|= Pab. We then also
say that the gossip state (G, σ) is terminal. A terminal call sequence is successful iff
after its execution all agents are experts. Otherwise it is unsuccessful.
• A protocol P is strongly successful on G iff all terminal P -permitted call
sequences are successful: G,  |= [P ]Ex.
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• A protocol is weakly successful on G iff some terminal P -permitted call se-
quences are successful: G,  |= 〈P 〉Ex.
• A protocol is unsuccessful on G iff no terminal P -permitted call sequences are
successful: G,  |= [P ]¬Ex.
A protocol is strongly successful iff it is strongly successful on all initial gossip graphs
G, and similarly for weakly successful and unsuccessful.
Instead of ‘is successful’ we also say ‘succeeds’, and instead of ‘terminal sequence’
we also say that the sequence is terminating. Given a gossip graph G and a P -
permitted sequence σ we say that the associated gossip graph Gσ is P -reachable
(from G). A terminal P -permitted sequence is also called an execution of P . Given
any set X of call sequences, X is the subset of the terminal sequences of X.
All our protocols can always be executed. If this is without making any calls, the
protocol extension is empty. Being empty does not mean that [P ]⊥ holds, which is
never the case.
Strong success implies weak success, but not vice versa. Formally, we have that
[P ]ϕ → 〈P 〉ϕ is valid for all protocols P , but 〈P 〉ϕ → [P ]ϕ is not valid in general,
because our protocols are typically non-deterministic.
We can distinguish unsuccessful termination (not all agents know all secrets)
from successful termination. In other works [16, 2] this distinction cannot be made.
In those works termination implies success.
Example 12. We continue with Example 3. The execution tree of LNS on this
graph is shown in Figure 1. We denote calls with gray arrows and the epistemic
relation with dotted lines. For example, agent a cannot distinguish whether call bc or
cb happened. At the end of each branch the termination of LNS is denoted with X if
successful, and × if unsuccessful.
To illustrate our semantics, for this graph G we have:
• G,  |= Nab ∧ ¬Sab — the call ab is LNS-permitted at the start.
• G,  |= [ab](Sab∧Sba) — after the call ab the agents a and b know each other’s
secret
• G,  |= [ab]〈ac〉> — after the call ab the call ac is possible.
• G,  |= [ab][LNS]Ex — after the call ab the LNS protocol will always terminate
successfully.
• G,  |= [bc ∪ cb][LNS]¬Ex — after the calls bc or cb the LNS protocol will
always terminate unsuccessfully.
168
Strengthening Gossip Protocols
a b c
a b c a b c a b c
a b c a b c a b c a b c a b c
a b c a b c a b c
ab bc cb
ac bc cb ab ab
bc ac ac
a
a
a
a
X X X
× ×
Figure 1: Example of an execution tree for LNS .
• G,  |= [bc ∪ cb]KLNSa (Sbc ∧ Scb) — after the calls bc or cb, agent a knows that
b and c know each others secret.
• G, ab; bc; ac |= ∧i∈{a,b,c}KLNSi Ex — after the call sequence ab; bc; ac everyone
knows that everyone is an expert.
We only have epistemic edges for agent a, and those are between states with identical
gossip graphs. If there are three agents, then if you are not involved in a call, you
know that the other two agents must have called. You may only be uncertain about
the direction of that call. But the direction of the call does not matter for the numbers
and secrets being exchanged. Hence all agents always know what the current gossip
graph is. For a more interesting epistemic relation, see Figure 2 in the Appendix.
2.4 Symmetric and epistemic protocols, and semantic protocols
Given a protocol P , for any a 6= b and c 6= d, the protocol conditions Pab and
Pcd can be different formulas. So a protocol may require different agents to obey
different rules. Although there are settings wherein this is interesting to investigate,
we want to restrict our investigation to those protocols where there is one protocol
condition to rule them all. This is enforced by the requirement of symmetry. Another
requirement is that the calling agent should know that the protocol condition is
satisfied before making a call. That is the requirement that the protocol be epistemic.
It is indispensable in order to see our protocols as distributed gossip protocols.
169
van Ditmarsch et. al.
Definition 13 (Symmetric and epistemic syntactic protocol). Let a syntactic protocol
P be given. Protocol P is symmetric iff for every permutation J of agents, we have
ϕJ(a)J(b) = J(ϕab), where J(ϕab) is the natural extension of J to formulas.2 Protocol
P is epistemic iff for every a, b ∈ A, the protocol condition Pab → KPa Pab is valid.
We henceforth require all our protocols to be symmetric and epistemic.
Intuitively, a protocol is epistemic if callers always know when to make a call,
without being given instructions by a central scheduler. This means that whenever
Pab is true, so agent a is allowed to call agent b, it must be the case that a knows that
Pab is true. In other words, in an epistemic protocol Pab implies KPa Pab. Furthermore,
by Definition 8 knowledge is truthful on the execution tree for protocol P in gossip
model. So except in the gossip states that cannot be reached using the protocol P ,
we also have that KPa Pab implies Pab.
If a protocol is symmetric the names of the agents are irrelevant and therefore
interchangeable. So a symmetric protocol is not allowed to “hard-code” agents to
perform certain roles. This means that, for example, we cannot tell agent a to call b,
as opposed to c, just because b comes before c in the alphabet. But we can tell a
to call b, as opposed to c, on the basis that, say, a knows that b knows five secrets
while c only knows two secrets. If a protocol P is symmetric, we can think of the
protocol condition as the unique protocol condition for P , modulo permutation.
Epistemic and symmetric protocols capture the distributed peer-to-peer nature
of the gossip problem.
Example 14. The protocols ANY and LNS are symmetric and epistemic. For ANY
this is trivial. For LNS , observe that agents always know which numbers and secrets
they know. A direct consequence of clause (2.) of Definition 7 of the epistemic relation
is that for any protocol P , if (G, σ) ∼Pa (G, σ′), then Nσa = Nσ
′
a and Sσa = Sσ
′
a . Thus,
applying the clause for knowledge KPa ϕ of Definition 8, we immediately get that the
following formulas are all valid: Nab→ KPa Nab, ¬Nab→ KPa ¬Nab, Sab→ KPa Sab,
and ¬Sab→ KPa ¬Sab. Therefore, in particular this holds for P = LNS .
Although the numbers and secrets known by an agent before and after a call
may vary, the agent always knows whether she knows a given number or secret.
Knowledge about other agents having a certain number or a secret is preserved after
calls. But, of course, knowledge about other agents not having a certain number or
secret is not preserved after calls.
2Formally: J(>) := >, J(Nab) := Nab, J(Sab) := Sab, J(¬ϕ) := ¬J(ϕ), J(ϕ∧ψ) := J(ϕ)∧J(ψ),
J(KPa ψ) := KJ(P )J(a) J(ψ), J(?ϕ) := ?J(ϕ), J(ab) := J(a)J(b), J(pi;pi
′) := J(pi); J(pi′), J(pi ∪ pi′) :=
J(pi) ∪ J(pi′), J(pi∗) := J(pi)∗.
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Not all protocols we discuss in this work are definable in the logical language. We
therefore need the additional notion of a semantic protocol, defined by its extension.
Definition 15 (Semantic protocol). A semantic protocol is a function P : G →
P((A×A)∗) mapping initial gossip graphs to sets of call sequences. We assume
semantic protocols to be closed under subsequences, i.e. for all G we want that
σ; ab ∈ P (G) implies σ ∈ P (G). For a semantic protocol P we say that a call ab is
P -permitted at (G, σ) iff (σ; ab) ∈ P (G).
Given any syntactic protocol we can view its extension as a semantic protocol.
Using this definition of permitted calls for semantic protocols we can apply Definition 7
to get the epistemic relation with respect to a semantic protocol P . Because the
relation ∼Pa depends only on which calls are allowed, the epistemic relation with
respect to a (syntactic) protocol P is identical to the epistemic relation with respect
to the extension of P .
We also require that semantic protocols are symmetric and epistemic, adapting
the definitions of these two properties as follows.
Definition 16 (Symmetric and epistemic semantic protocol). A semantic protocol
P is symmetric iff for all initial gossip graphs G and for all permutations J of agents
we have P (J(G)) = J(P (G)) (where J(P (G)) := {J(σ) | σ ∈ P (G)}). A semantic
protocol P is epistemic iff for all initial gossip graphs G and for all σ ∈ P (G) we
have: (σ; ab) ∈ P (G) iff for all τ ∼Pa σ we have (τ ; ab) ∈ P (G).
It is easy to verify that the syntactic definition of an epistemic protocol agrees
with the semantic definition.
Proposition 17. A syntactic protocol P is epistemic if and only if its extension is
epistemic.
Proof. Let Q be the extension of P and note that, as remarked above, the epistemic
relations induced by P and Q are identical. Now we have the following chain of
equivalences:
P is not epistemic
⇔ ∃a, b,G, σ : G, σ 6|= Pab → KPa Pab
⇔ ∃a, b,G, σ, τ : G, σ |= Pab, G, τ 6|= Pab and (G, σ) ∼Pa (G, τ)
⇔ ∃a, b,G, σ, τ : (σ; ab) ∈ Q(G), (τ ; ab) 6∈ Q(G) and (G, σ) ∼Pa (G, τ)
⇔ ∃a, b,G, σ, τ : (σ; ab) ∈ Q(G), (τ ; ab) 6∈ Q(G) and (G, σ) ∼Qa (G, τ)
⇔ Q is not epistemic
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Note that Proposition 17 does not imply that every epistemic semantic protocol
is the extension of a syntactic epistemic protocol, since some semantic protocols are
not the extension of any syntactic protocol.
For symmetry, the situation is slightly more complex than for being epistemic.
Proposition 18. If a syntactic protocol P is symmetric, then its extension is
symmetric.
Proof. Let Q be the extension of P . Fix any permutation J and any initial gossip
graph G. To show is that Q(J(G)) = J(Q(G)) (where J is extended to gossip graphs
in the natural way). We show by induction that for every call sequence σ, we have
σ ∈ Q(J(G))⇔ σ ∈ J(Q(G)).
As base case, note that  ∈ Q(J(G)) and  ∈ J(Q(G)). Now, as induction
hypothesis, assume that for every call sequence τ that is shorter than σ, we have
τ ∈ Q(J(G))⇔ τ ∈ J(Q(G)). Let ab be the final call in σ, so σ = (τ ; ab). Then we
have the following sequence of equivalences:
(τ ; ab) ∈ Q(J(G))⇔ J(G), τ |= Pab
⇔ G, J−1(τ) |= J−1(Pab)
⇔ G, J−1(τ) |= PJ−1(ab)
⇔ (J−1(τ); J−1(ab)) ∈ Q(G)
⇔ (τ ; ab) ∈ J(Q(G)),
where the equivalence on the third line is due to P being symmetric. This completes
the induction step and thereby the proof.
The converse of Proposition 18 does not hold: if P is not symmetric, it is still
possible for its extension to be symmetric. The reason for this discrepancy is that
symmetry for syntactic protocols has the very strong condition that J(Pab) = PJ(ab).
So if P is symmetric and P ′ is given by (i) P ′cd = Pcd ∧ > and (ii) P ′ab = Pab for
a, b 6= c, d, then P ′ is not symmetric even though P and P ′ have the same extension.
We do, however, have the following slightly weaker statement. Recall that a gossip
state (G, σ) is P -reachable iff the call sequence σ is P -permitted at G.
Proposition 19. Let P be a syntactic protocol such that, for some P -reachable gossip
state (G, σ), some permutation J and some a, b we have G, σ 6|= PJ(ab) ↔ J(Pab).
Then the extension of P is not symmetric.
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Proof. Let Q be the extension of P , and suppose towards a contradiction that Q is
symmetric. Then we have the following sequence of equivalences:
G, σ |= PJ(ab) ⇔ (σ; J(ab)) ∈ Q(G)
⇔ (J−1(σ); ab) ∈ J−1(Q(G))
⇔ (J−1(σ); ab) ∈ Q(J−1(G))
⇔ J−1(G), J−1(σ) |= Pab
⇔ G, σ |= J(Pab),
where the equivalence on the third line is due to Q being symmetric. This contradicts
G, σ 6|= PJ(ab) ↔ J(Pab), from which it follows that Q is not symmetric.
So while P may be non-symmetric and still have a symmetric extension, this
can only happen if J(Pab) is equivalent to PJ(ab) in all reachable gossip states. We
conclude that our syntactic and semantic definitions of symmetry agree up to logical
equivalence.
3 Strengthening of Protocols
3.1 How can we strengthen a protocol?
In our semantics it is common knowledge among the agents that they follow a certain
protocol, for example LNS . Can they use this information to prevent making “bad”
calls that lead to an unsuccessful sequence?
If we look at the execution graph given in Figure 1, then it seems easy to fix the
protocol. Agents b and c should wait and not make the first call. Agent b should
not make a call before he has received a call from a. We cannot say this in our logic
as we have no converse modalities to reason over past calls. In this case however,
there is a different way to ensure the same result. We can ensure that b and c wait
before calling by a strengthening of LNS that only allows a first call from i to j if
j does not know the number of i. To determine that a call is not the first call, we
need another property: after at least one call happened, there is an agent who knows
another agent’s secret.
We can define this new protocol by protocol condition Pij := LNS ij ∧ (¬Nji ∨∨
k 6=l Skl). Observe that this new protocol is again symmetric and epistemic: agents
always know whether (¬Nji ∨ ∨k 6=l Skl). Because of synchronicity, not only the
callers but also all other agents know that there are agents k and l such that k knows
the secret of l. This is an ad-hoc solution specific to this initial gossip graph. Could
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we also give a general definition to improve LNS which works on more or even all
initial graphs? The answer to that is: more, yes, but all, no.
We will now discuss different ways to improve protocols by making them more
restrictive. Our goal is to rule out unsuccessful sequences while keeping at least some
successful ones. Doing this can be difficult because we still require the strengthened
protocols to be epistemic and symmetric. Hence we are not allowed to arbitrarily
rule out specific calls using the names of agents, for example. Whenever a call is
removed from the protocol, we also have to remove all calls to other agents that the
caller cannot distinguish: it has to be done uniformly. But before we discuss specific
ideas for strengthening, let us define it.
Definition 20 (Strengthening). A protocol P ′ is a syntactic strengthening of a
protocol P iff P ′ab → Pab is valid for all agents a 6= b. A protocol P ′ is a semantic
strengthening of a protocol P iff P ′ ⊆ P .
A syntactic strengthening procedure is a function ♥ that for any syntactic protocol
P returns a syntactic strengthening P♥ of P . Analogously, we define semantic
strengthening procedure.
We stress that strengthening is a relation between two protocols P and P ′ whereas
strengthening procedures define a restricting transformation that given any P tells
us how to obtain P ′. In the case of a syntactic strengthening, P and P ′ are implicitly
required to be syntactic protocols. Vice versa however, syntactic protocols can be
semantic strengthenings. In fact, we have the following.
Proposition 21. Every syntactic strengthening is a semantic strengthening.
Proof. Let P ′ be a syntactic strengthening of a protocol P . Let a gossip graph G be
given. We show by induction on the length of σ that σ ∈ P ′(G) implies σ ∈ P (G).
The base case where σ =  is trivial.
For the induction step, consider any σ = τ ; ab. As τ ; ab ∈ P ′(G), we also have
τ ∈ P ′(G) and G, τ |= P ′ab. From τ ∈ P ′(G) and the inductive hypothesis, it follows
that τ ∈ P (G). From G, τ |= P ′ab and the validity of P ′ab → Pab follows G, τ |= Pab.
Finally, by Definition 10, τ ∈ P (G) and G, τ |= Pab imply τ ; ab ∈ P (G).
Lemma 22. Suppose P is a strengthening of Q. Then KQa ϕ→ KPa ϕ and KˆPa ϕ→
KˆQa ϕ are both valid, for any agent a.
Proof. This follows immediately from the semantics of protocol-dependent knowledge
given in Definition 8.
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3.2 Syntactic Strengthening: Look-Ahead and One-Step
We will now present concrete examples of syntactic strengthening procedures.
Definition 23 (Look-Ahead and One-Step Strengthenings). We define four syntactic
strengthening procedures as follows. Let P be a protocol.
hard look-ahead strengthening : Pab := Pab ∧KPa [ab]〈P 〉Ex
soft look-ahead strengthening : Pab := Pab ∧ KˆPa [ab]〈P 〉Ex
hard one-step strengthening : Pab := Pab ∧KPa [ab](Ex ∨
∨
i,j(Nij ∧ Pij))
soft one-step strengthening : P♦ab := Pab ∧ KˆPa [ab](Ex ∨
∨
i,j(Nij ∧ Pij))
The hard look-ahead strengthening allows agents to make a call iff the call is
allowed by the original protocol and moreover they know that making this call yields
a situation where the original protocol can still succeed.
For example, consider LNS. Informally, its condition is that a is permitted to
call b iff a does not have the secret of b and a knows that after making the call to b,
it is still possible to follow LNS in such a way that all agents become experts.
The soft look-ahead strengthening allows more calls than the hard look-ahead
strengthening because it only demands that a considers it possible that the protocol
can succeed after the call. This can be interpreted as a good faith or lucky draw
assumption that the previous calls between other agents have been made “in a good
way”. Soft look-ahead strengthening allows agents to take a risk.
The soft and the hard look-ahead strengthening include a diamond 〈P 〉 labeled
with the protocol P, where that protocol P by definition contains arbitrary iteration:
the Kleene star ∗. To evaluate this, we need to compute the execution tree of P for
the initial gossip graph G. In practice this can make it hard to check the protocol
condition of the new protocol.
The one-step strengthenings, in contrast, only use the protocol condition Pij in
their formalization and not the entire protocol P . This means that they provide an
easier to compute, but less reliable alternative to full look-ahead, namely by looking
only one step ahead. We only demand that agent a knows (or, in the soft version,
considers it possible) that after the call, everyone is an expert or the protocol can
still go on for at least one more step — though it might be that all continuation
sequences will eventually be unsuccessful and thus this next call would already have
been excluded by both look-ahead strengthenings.
An obvious question now is, can these or other strengthenings get us from weak
to strong success? Do these strengthenings only remove unsuccessful sequences, or
will they also remove successful branches, and maybe even return an empty and
unsuccessful protocol? In our next example everything still works fine.
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Example 24. Consider Example 12 again. It is easy to see that the soft and the
hard look-ahead strengthening rule out the two unsuccessful branches in this execution
tree and keep the successful ones. Protocol LNS only preserves alternatives that are
all successful and LNS only eliminates alternatives if they are all unsuccessful. In
the execution tree in Figure 1, the effect is the same for LNS and LNS, because
at any state the agents always know which calls lead to successful branches. This
is typical for gossip scenarios with three agents: if a call happened, the agent not
involved in the call might be unsure about the direction of the call, but it knows who
the callers are.
The one-step strengthenings are not enough to rule out the unsuccessful sequences.
This is because the unsuccessful sequences are of length 2 but the one-step strengthen-
ings can only remove the last call in a sequence. In this case, the protocols LNS
and LNS♦ rule out the call ab after bc or cb happened.
3.3 Semantic Strengthening: Uniform Backward Defoliation
We now present two semantic strengthening procedures. They are inspired by the
notion of backward induction, a well-known solution concept in decision theory and
game theory [32]. We will discuss this at greater length when defining the arbitrary
iteration of these semantic strengthenings and in Section 5.
In backward induction, given a game tree or search tree, a parent node is called
bad if all its children are loosing or bad nodes. Similarly, in trees with information
sets of indistinguishable nodes, a parent node can be called bad if all its children
are bad and if also all children from indistinguishable nodes are bad. Similar notions
were considered in [7, 35]. Again, we have a soft and a hard version. We define
uniform backward defoliation on the execution trees of dynamic gossip as follows to
obtain two semantic strengthenings. We choose the name “defoliation” here because
a single application of this strengthening procedure only removes leaves and not
whole branches of the execution tree. The iterated versions we present later are then
called uniform backward induction.
Definition 25 (Uniform Backward Defoliation). Suppose we have a protocol P and
an initial gossip graph G. We define the Hard Uniform Backward Defoliation (HUBD)
and Soft Uniform Backward Defoliation (SUBD) of P as follows.
PHUBD(G) := {σ ∈ P (G) | σ = , or σ = τ ; ab and ∀(G, τ ′) ∼Pa (G, τ)
such that τ ′ ∈ P (G) implies (G, τ ′; ab) |= Ex}
P SUBD(G) := {σ ∈ P (G) | σ = , or σ = τ ; ab and ∃(G, τ ′) ∼Pa (G, τ)
such that τ ′ ∈ P (G) implies (G, τ ′; ab) |= Ex}
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In this definition, ∀(G, τ ′) ∼Pa (G, τ) implicitly stands for “for all τ ′ ∈ P (G) such
that (G, τ ′) ∼Pa (G, τ)”, because for (G, τ ′) to be in ∼Pa relation to another gossip
state, τ ′ must be P -permitted; similarly for the existential quantification.
The HUBD strengthening keeps the calls which must lead to a non-terminal state
or a state where everyone is an expert and SUBD keeps the calls which might do so.
Equivalently, we can say that HUBD removes calls which may go wrong and SUBD
removes those calls which will go wrong — where going wrong means leading to a
terminal node where not everyone is an expert.
We can now prove that for any gossip protocol Hard Uniform Backward Defoliation
is the same as Hard One-Step Strengthening, in the sense that their extensions are
the same on any gossip graph, and that Soft Uniform Backward Defoliation is the
same as Soft One-Step Strengthening.
Theorem 26. P = PHUBD and P♦ = P SUBD
Proof. Note that  is an element of both sides of both equations. For any non-empty
sequence we have the following chain of equivalences for the hard versions of UBD
and one-step strengthening:
(σ; ab) ∈ P(G)
m by Definition 10
G, σ |= Pab
m by Definition 23
G, σ |= Pab ∧KPa [ab]
(∨
i,j(Nij ∧ Pij) ∨ Ex
)
m by Definition 8
(σ; ab) ∈ P (G) and (G, σ)  KPa [ab]
(∨
i,j(Nij ∧ Pij) ∨ Ex
)
m by Definition 8
(σ; ab) ∈ P (G) and ∀(G, σ′) ∼Pa (G, σ) : (G, σ′; ab) |=
∨
i,j(Nij ∧ Pij) ∨ Ex
m by Definition 11
(σ; ab) ∈ P (G) and ∀(G, σ′) ∼Pa (G, σ) : σ′; ab /∈ P (G) or (G, σ′; ab) |= Ex
m by Definition 25
(σ; ab) ∈ PHUBD(G)
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And we have a similar chain of equivalences for the soft versions:
(σ; ab) ∈ P♦(G)
m by Definition 10
G, σ |= P♦ab
m by Definition 23
G, σ |= Pab ∧ KˆPa [ab]
(∨
i,j(Nij ∧ Pij) ∨ Ex
)
m by Definition 8
(σ; ab) ∈ P (G) and (G, σ) |= KˆPa [ab]
(∨
i,j(Nij ∧ Pij) ∨ Ex
)
m by Definition 8
(σ; ab) ∈ P (G) and ∃(G, σ′) ∼Pa (G, σ) : (G, σ′; ab) |=
∨
i,j(Nij ∧ Pij) ∨ Ex
m by Definition 11
(σ; ab) ∈ P (G) and ∃(G, σ′) ∼Pa (G, σ) : σ′; ab /∈ P (G) or (G, σ′; ab) |= Ex
m by Definition 25
(σ; ab) ∈ P SUBD(G)
Similarly to backward induction in perfect information games [4], uniform back-
ward defoliation is rational, in the sense that it forces an agent to avoid calls leading
to unsuccessful sequences. The strengthening SUBD avoids a call if it always leads
to an unsuccessful sequence. The strengthening HUBD avoids a call if it sometimes
leads to a unsuccessful sequence.
3.4 Iterated Strengthenings
The syntactic strengthenings we looked at are all defined in terms of the original
protocol. In Pab := Pab ∧KPa [ab]〈P 〉Ex the given P occurs in three places. Firstly,
in the protocol condition Pab requiring that the call is permitted according to the old
protocol P — this ensures that the new protocol is a strengthening of the original P .
Secondly, as a parameter to the knowledge operator, in KPa , which means that agent
a knows that everyone followed P (and that this is common knowledge). Thirdly, in
the part 〈P 〉 assuming that after the considered call everyone will continue to follow
protocol P in the future.
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Hence we have strengthened the protocol that the agents use and thereby changed
their behavior, but not their assumptions about what protocol other agents follow. For
example, when P = LNS , all agents now act according to LNS, on the assumption
that all other agents act according to LNS . This does not mean that agents cannot
determine what they know if LNS were common knowledge: each agent a can check
that knowledge using KLNSa ϕ. But this KLNS

a modality is not part of the protocol
LNS. The agents do not use this knowledge to determine whether to make calls.
But why should our agents stop their reasoning here? It is natural to iterate
strengthening procedures and determine whether we can further improve our protocols
by also updating the knowledge of the agents.
For example, consider repeated hard one-step strengthening:
(P)ab = P

ab ∧ KˆP

a [ab](Ex ∨
∨
i,j
(Nij ∧ Pij ))
In this section we investigate iterations and combinations of strengthening proce-
dures. In particular we investigate various combinations of hard and soft one-step
and look-ahead strengthening, in order to determine how they relate to each other.
Definition 27 (Strengthening Iteration). Let P be a syntactic protocol. For any of
the four syntactic strengthening procedures ♥ ∈ {,,,♦}, we define its iteration
by adjusting the protocol condition as follows, which implies P♥1 = P♥:
P♥0ab := Pab
P
♥(k+1)
ab := (P♥k)
♥
ab
Let now P be a semantic protocol, and let ♥ ∈ {HUBD, SUBD}. We define their
iteration, for all gossip graphs G, by:
P♥0(G) := P (G)
P♥(k+1)(G) := (P♥k)♥(G)
It is easy to check that Theorem 26 generalizes to the iterated strengthenings as
follows.
Corollary 28. For any k ∈ N, we have:
Pk = PHUBDk and P♦k = P SUBDk
Proof. By induction using Theorem 26.
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Example 29. We reconsider Examples 12 and 24, and we recall that LNS and
LNS♦ rule out the call ab after bc or cb happened. To eliminate bc and cb as the first
call, we have to iterate one-step strengthening: (LNS) is strongly successful on
this graph, as well as (LNS♦)♦, (LNS)♦ and (LNS♦).
Example 30. We consider the “N”-shaped gossip graph shown below. There are 21
LNS sequences for this graph, of which 4 are successful (X) and 17 are unsuccessful
(×).
1 0
3 2 20; 30; 01; 31 ×
20; 30; 31; 01 ×
20; 31; 10; 30 ×
20; 31; 30; 10 ×
30; 01; 20; 31 ×
30; 01; 31; 20 ×
30; 20; 01; 21; 31 X
30; 20; 01; 31; 21 X
30; 20; 21; 01; 31 X
30; 20; 21; 31; 01 X
30; 20; 31; 01; 21 ×
30; 20; 31; 21; 01 ×
30; 31; 01; 20 ×
30; 31; 20; 01; 21 ×
30; 31; 20; 21; 01 ×
31; 10; 20; 30 ×
31; 10; 30; 20 ×
31; 20; 10; 30 ×
31; 20; 30; 10 ×
31; 30; 10; 20 ×
31; 30; 20; 10 ×
We can show the call sequences in a more compact way if we only distinguish call
sequences up to the moment when it is decided whether LNS will succeed. Formally,
consider the set of minimal σ ∈ LNS(G) such that for all two terminal LNS-sequences
τ, τ ′ ∈ LNS(G) extending σ, we have G, τ |= Ex iff G, τ ′ |= Ex. We will use this
shortening convention throughout the paper.
20 ×
30; 01 ×
30; 20; 01 X
30; 20; 21 X
30; 20; 31 ×
30; 31 ×
31 ×
It is pretty obvious what the agents should do here: Agent 2 should not make
the first call but let 3 call 0 first. The soft look-ahead strengthening works well on
this graph: It disallows all unsuccessful sequences and keeps all successful ones. For
example, after call 30, agent 2 considers it possible that call 30 happened and in this
case the call 20 can lead to success. Hence the protocol condition of LNS is fulfilled.
The strengthening LNS is strongly successful on this graph.
But note that 2 does not know that 20 can lead to success, because the first call
could have been 31 as well and for agent 2 this would be indistinguishable from 30.
Therefore the hard look-ahead strengthening is too restrictive here. In fact, the only
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call which LNS still allows is 30 at the beginning. After that no more calls are
allowed by the hard look-ahead strengthening.
A full list showing which call sequences are allowed by which strengthenings of
LNS for this example is provided in Table 2. “Full” means that we continue iterating
the strengthening until P♥k(G) = P♥(k+1)(G) for the given graph G. Such fixpoints
of protocol strengthening will be formally introduced in the next section.
The hard look-ahead strengthening restricts the set of allowed calls based on
a full analysis of the whole execution tree. One might thus expect, that applying
hard look-ahead more than once would not make a difference. However, we have
the following negative results on iterating hard look-ahead strengthening and the
combination of hard look-ahead and hard one-step strengthening.
Fact 31. Hard look-ahead strengthening is not idempotent and does not always yield
a fixpoint of hard one-step strengthening:
(i) There exist a graph G and a protocol P for which P(G) 6= (P)(G).
(ii) There exist a graph G and a protocol P for which (P)(G) 6= P(G).
Proof.
(i) Let G be the “N” graph from Example 30 and consider the protocol P = LNS .
Applying hard look-ahead strengthening once only allows the first call 30 and
nothing after that call. If we now apply hard look-ahead strengthening again
we get the empty set: P(G) 6= (P)(G) = ∅. See also Table 2.
(ii) The “diamond” graph that we will present in Section 3.6 can serve as an example
here. We can show that the inequality holds for this graph by exhaustive search,
using our Haskell implementation described in the Appendix. Plain LNS has
48 successful and 44 unsuccessful sequences on this graph. Of these, LNS
still includes 8 successful and 8 unsuccessful sequences. If we now apply hard
one-step strengthening, we get (LNS) where 4 of the unsuccessful sequences
are removed. See also Table 3 in the Appendix. We note that for P = LNS
there is no smaller graph to show the inequality. This can be checked by manual
reasoning or with our implementation.
Similarly, we can ask whether the soft strengthenings are related to each other,
analogous to Fact 31. We do not know whether there is a protocol P for which
(P)♦ 6= P and leave this as an open question.
Another interesting property that strengthenings can have is monotonicity. Intu-
itively, a strengthening is monotone iff it preserves the inclusion relation between
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extensions of protocols. This property is useful to study the fixpoint behavior of
strengthenings. We will now define monotonicity formally and then obtain some
results for it.
Definition 32. A strengthening ♥ is called monotone iff for all protocols Q and P
such that Q ⊆ P , we also have Q♥ ⊆ P♥.
Proposition 33 (Soft one-step strengthening is monotone). Let P be a protocol and
Q be an arbitrary strengthening of P , i.e. Q ⊆ P . Then we also have Q♦ ⊆ P♦.
Proof. As Q is a strengthening of P , the formula Qab → Pab is valid. We want to
show that Q♦ab → P♦ab. Suppose that G, σ |= Q♦ab, i.e.:
G, σ |= Qab and G, σ |= KˆQa [ab](Ex ∨
∨
i,j
(Nij ∧Qij))
From the first part and the validity of Qab → Pab, we get G, σ |= Pab. The second part
and the validity of Qij → Pij give us G, σ |= KˆQa [ab](Ex ∨
∨
i,j(Nij∧Pij)). From that
and Lemma 22 it follows that G, σ |= KˆPa [ab](Ex ∨
∨
i,j(Nij ∧Pij)). Combining these,
it follows by definition of soft one-step strengthening that we have G, σ |= P♦ab.
Proposition 34 (Both hard strengthenings are not monotone). Let P and Q be
protocols. If Q ⊆ P , then (i) Q ⊆ P may not hold, and also (ii) Q ⊆ P may
not hold.
Proof. (i) Hard one-step strengthening is not monotone:
Consider the “spaceship” graph below with four agents 0, 1, 2 and 3 where 0 and
3 know 1’s number, 1 knows 2’s number, and 2 knows no numbers.
0
1
3
2
On this graph the LNS sequences up to decision point are:
01; 02 ×
01; 12 ×
01; 31; 02 ×
01; 31; 12 X
01; 31; 32 X
12 ×
31; 01; 02 X
31; 01; 12 X
31; 01; 32 ×
31; 12 ×
31; 32 ×
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Note that
LNS(G) =

(01; 31; 12; 02; 32), (01; 31; 12; 32; 02), (01; 31; 32; 02; 12),
(01; 31; 32; 12; 02), (31; 01; 02; 12; 32), (31; 01; 02; 32; 12),
(31; 01; 12; 02; 32), (31; 01; 12; 32; 02)

is strongly successful and therefore hard one-step strengthening does not change it —
we have (LNS)(G) = LNS(G). On the other hand, consider
LNS(G) =

(01; 02; 12), (01; 12; 02), (01; 31; 02; 12), (01; 31; 02; 32),
(01; 31; 12; 32; 02), (01; 31; 32; 12; 02), (12; 01), (12; 31),
(31; 01; 02; 12; 32), (31; 01; 12; 02; 32), (31; 01; 32; 02),
(31; 01; 32; 12), (31; 12; 32), (31; 32; 12)

and note that this is not a superset of (LNS)(G) = LNS(G), because we have
(01; 31; 12; 02; 32) ∈ (LNS)(G) = LNS(G) but (01; 31; 12; 02; 32) /∈ LNS(G).
Together, we have LNS(G) ⊆ LNS(G) but (LNS)(G) 6⊆ LNS(G).
Hence Q = LNS ⊆ LNS = P is a counterexample and  is not monotone.
(ii) Hard look-ahead strengthening is not monotone:
For hard look-ahead strengthening we can use the same example. Because
LNS is strongly successful, hard look-ahead strengthening does not change it:
(LNS)(G) = LNS(G).
Moreover, LNS(G) = {(01), (31)} is not a superset of (LNS)(G) = LNS(G).
Together we have LNS(G) ⊆ LNS(G) but (LNS)(G) 6⊆ LNS(G), hence
hard look-ahead strengthening is not monotone either.
This result is relevant for our pursuit to pin down how rational agents can employ
common knowledge of a protocol to improve upon it. It shows that hard look-ahead
strengthening is not rational, as follows.
We consider again the “spaceship” graph in the proof of Proposition 34. Let
us define a bad call as a call after which no successful continuation is possible.
Correspondingly, a good call is one after which success is still possible. The initial
call could be 12, but that is a bad call. All successful LNS sequences on this graph
start with 01; 31 or 31; 01.
Let us place ourselves in the position of agent 3 after the call 01 has been made.
As far as 3 can tell (if the only background common knowledge is that everyone
follows LNS), the first call may have been 12, at which point no agent can make a
good call because no continuation is successful. In particular, the second call 31 is
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then bad. So 3 will not call 1, because it is possible that the call 31 is bad, and we
are following hard look-ahead.
Symmetrically, the same reasoning is made by agent 0: even if the first call is
31, it could also have been 12, after which any continuation is unsuccessful, and
therefore 0 will not call 1, which again seems irrational.
So nobody will make a call. The extension of LNS on this graph is empty.
But as all agents know that 12 is bad, agent 1 knows this in particular, and as
agent 1 is rational herself, she would therefore not have made that call. And agents
3 and 0 can draw that conclusion too. It therefore seems after all irrational for 3 not
to call 1, or for 0 not to call 1.
This shows that hard look-ahead strengthening is not rational. In particular, it
ignores the rationality of other agents.
3.5 Limits and Fixpoints of Strengthenings
Given the iteration of strengthenings we discussed in the previous section, it is natural
to consider limits and fixpoints of strengthening procedures. In this subsection we
discuss them and give some small results. A detailed investigation is deferred to
future research.
Note that the protocol conditions of all four basic syntactic strengthenings are
conjunctions with the original protocol condition as a conjunct. Therefore, all these
four strengthenings are non-increasing: For all ♥ ∈ {,,,♦} and all protocols P ,
we have P♥ ⊆ P . The same holds, by definition, for semantic strengthenings. This
implies that if, on any gossip graph, we start with a protocol that only allows finite
call sequences, such as LNS , then applying strengthening repeatedly will eventually
lead to a fixpoint. This fixpoint might be the empty set, or a non-empty set and
thereby provide a new protocol.
For other protocols that allow infinite call sequences, such as ANY , we do not
know if this procedure leads to a unique fixpoint and whether fixpoints are always
reached. We therefore distinguish fixpoints from limits.
Definition 35 (Strengthening Limit; Fixpoint). Consider any strengthening ♥. The
♥-limit of a given protocol P is the semantic protocol P♥∗ defined as ⋂k∈N P♥k. A
given protocol P is a fixpoint of a strengthening ♥ iff P = P♥.
Note that limit protocols P♥∗ are not in the logical language, unlike their constituents
P♥k. We now define P∗ as Hard Uniform Backward Induction, and P♦∗ as Soft
Uniform Backward Induction. Again using induction on Theorem 26, it follows
that Uniform Backward Induction is the same as arbitrarily often iterated Uniform
Backward Defoliation.
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Corollary 36.
P∗ = PHUBD∗ and P♦∗ = P SUBD∗.
Example 37. Consider P = LNS . The number of LNS calls between n agents is
bounded by
(n
2
)
= n(n − 1)/2. The limit LNS♥∗ is therefore reached after a finite
number of iterations, and expressible in the gossip protocol language: LNS♥n(n−1)/2 =
LNS♥∗.
As a further observation, the look-ahead strengthenings are not always the
limits of one-step strengthenings. In other words, we do not have for all G that
P∗(G) = P(G) or that P♦∗(G) = P(G). Counterexamples are the “N” graph
from Example 30 and the extension of various strengthenings relating to the example
in the upcoming Section 3.6, as shown in Table 3 in the Appendix.
However, we know by the Knaster-Tarski theorem [37] that on any gossip graph
soft one-step strengthening ♦ has a unique greatest fixpoint, because ♦ is monotone
and the lattice we are working in is the powerset of the set of all call sequences and
thereby complete.
3.6 Detailed Example: the Diamond Gossip Graph
Consider the initial “diamond” gossip graph below.
0
1
2 3
There are 92 different terminating sequences of LNS calls for this initial graph of
which 48 are successful and 44 are unsuccessful. Also below we give an overview of
all sequences. For brevity we only list them in the compact way, up to the call after
which success has been decided.
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20; 01 ×
20; 21 ×
20; 30; 01 X
20; 30; 21 ×
20; 30; 31 X
20; 31 X
21; 10 ×
21; 20 ×
21; 30 X
21; 31; 10 X
21; 31; 20 ×
21; 31; 30 X
30; 01 ×
30; 20; 01 X
30; 20; 21 X
30; 20; 31 ×
30; 21 X
30; 31 ×
31; 10 ×
31; 20 X
31; 21; 10 X
31; 21; 20 X
31; 21; 30 ×
31; 30 ×
Table 1 shows how many sequences are permitted by the different strengthen-
ings. Both soft strengthenings rule out no successful sequences and rule out some
unsuccessful sequences. The hard look-ahead strengthening removes some successful
sequences and rules out the same number of unsuccessful sequences as the soft
lookahead strengthening, but interestingly enough this is a different set.
This demonstrates that Table 1 may be misleading: the same number of sequences
does not imply the same set of sequences. Table 3 in the Appendix is more detailed
and lists sequences. If a further iteration of a strengthening does not change the
number and also not the set of sequences, it has the same extension, and is therefore a
fixpoint. For example, Table 3 shows that LNS♦2 and LNS♦3 both have 48 successful
and 32 unsuccessful sequences on the diamond graph. They also have the same
extension, hence LNS♦2 is a fixpoint of ♦ on this graph.
Recall that one-step strengthening is uniform backward defoliation (Theorem 26)
and that the limit of one-step strengthening is uniform backward induction (Corol-
lary 36). Table 1 shows the difference between the look-ahead strengthenings and
the one-step/defoliation strengthenings. Although on this “diamond” graph, the
hard strengthenings LNSk and LNSk have the same fixpoint, namely the empty
extension for all k ≥ 4, the soft strengthenings LNSk and LNS♦k have different
fixpoints. Both are reached when k = 2.
We now present two strengthenings that are strongly successful on this graph
(only successfully terminating call sequences remain).
Firstly, consider the protocol (LNS♦)3. Its extension is as follows, see also
Tables 1 and 3.
20; 30; 01; 31; 21
20; 30; 31; 01; 21
20; 31; 10; 30; 21
20; 31; 30; 10; 21
21; 30; 01; 31; 20
21; 30; 31; 01; 20
21; 31; 10; 30; 20
21; 31; 30; 10; 20
30; 20; 01; 21; 31
30; 20; 21; 01; 31
30; 21; 10; 20; 31
30; 21; 20; 10; 31
31; 20; 01; 21; 30
31; 20; 21; 01; 30
31; 21; 10; 20; 30
31; 21; 20; 10; 30
Its extension has no sequences with only four calls. There are sequences with
redundant second-to-last calls, for example 10 in 20; 31; 30; 10; 21.
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Protocol # successful # unsuccessful
LNS 48 44
LNS 8 8
LNS2 0 4
LNS3 0 0
LNS 48 8
LNS2 48 8
LNS3 48 8
LNS 24 36
LNS2 8 16
LNS3 8 4
LNS4 0 4
LNS5 0 0
LNS♦ 48 36
LNS♦2 48 32
LNS♦3 48 32
(LNS♦)3 16 0
((LNS♦))

16 0
Table 1: Statistics for the diamond example.
Secondly, we present a protocol that is strongly successful on this graph and
that has no redundant calls. Its description is far more involved than the previous
protocol, but the effort seems worthwhile as is shows that: (i) for some initial gossip
graphs we can strengthen LNS up to finding strongly successful as well as optimal
extensions; (ii) the hard and soft strengthening procedures described so far merely
touch the surface and are not all that goes around, because one can easily show that
the following protocol does not correspond to any of those or their iterations.
We first describe it as a semantic protocol, liberally referring to call histories in
our description (which cannot be done in our logical language) and only then give a
formalization using the syntax of our protocol logic. Consider the following semantic
protocol:
(1) agent 2 or agent 3 makes a call to either 0 or 1.
(2) the agent among 2 and 3 that did not make a call in step (1) calls
either 0 or 1.
(3) the agent x that made the call in step (2) now makes a second call; if
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x called agent 1 before then x now calls 0 and vice versa.
(4) the agent y that made the call in step (1) now makes a second call; if
y called agent 1 before then y now calls 0 and vice versa.
(5) if the agent z that was called in step (2) is not yet an expert, then z
calls the last remaining agent whose secret z does not know.
Now let us explain why this protocol is strongly successful on the “diamond” graph,
and why it is a strengthening of LNS . There are four possibilities for the first call:
2 may call 0, 2 may call 1, 3 may call 0 or 3 may call 1. These four cases are
symmetrical, so let us assume that the first call is 20. The next call will then be
made by agent 3, and there are two possibilities: either 3 also calls agent 0, or 3 calls
agent 1. The call sequences, and the secrets known by the agents after each call has
been made, are shown in the following two tables.
First case: 2 and 3 call the same agent
Stage Call 0 1 2 3
(1) 20 {0, 2} {1} {0, 2} {3}
(2) 30 {0, 2, 3} {1} {0, 2} {0, 2, 3}
(3) 31 {0, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 2} {0, 1, 2, 3}
(4) 21 {0, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3}
(5) 01 {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3}
Second case: 2 and 3 call different agents
Stage Call 0 1 2 3
(1) 20 {0, 2} {1} {0, 2} {3}
(2) 31 {0, 2} {1, 3} {0, 2} {1, 3}
(3) 30 {0, 1, 2, 3} {1, 3} {0, 2} {0, 1, 2, 3}
(4) 21 {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3} {0, 1, 2, 3}
Note that all of these calls are possible, in the sense that all callers know the number
of the agent they are calling. Agents 2 and 3 start out knowing the numbers of 0
and 1, so the calls 20, 30, 21 and 31 are possible from the start. Furthermore, agent
0 learns the number of agent 1 from agent 2 in the first call, so after the call 20 the
call 01 is also possible.
In the second case there is no fifth call, since the agent that received the call
in step (2) is already an expert after step (4). As a result, there are no redundant
calls in either possible call sequence. Furthermore, in either case, all agents become
experts. Finally, every call is to an agent whose secret is unknown to the caller before
the call. So, the described protocol is a strongly successful strengthening of LNS .
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The two call sequences shown above are possible if the first call is 20. There are
six other call sequences corresponding to the other three options for the first call.
Overall, the protocol allows the following 8 sequences.
20; 30; 31; 21; 01
20; 31; 30; 21
21; 31; 30; 20; 10
21; 30; 31; 20
30; 20; 21; 31; 01
30; 21; 20; 31
31; 21; 20; 30; 10
31; 20; 21; 30
We can also define a syntactic protocol that has the above semantic protocol as
its extension. This syntactic protocol is not particularly elegant, but it illustrates
how the logical language can be used to express more complex conditions. The
call condition Pij of this syntactic protocol is of the form Pij = Kiψij (where Ki
abbreviates KANYi , as defined in Section 2.2). This guarantees that the protocol is
epistemic, because Lemma 22 implies that Kiψij → KPi Kiψij is valid. The formula
ψij is a disjunction with the following five disjuncts, one for each of the clauses (1) –
(5) of the protocol as described above.
The formula ϕ0 :=
∧
k
∧
l 6=k ¬Skl holds if and only if no calls have taken place yet.
Since agents 2 and 3 are the only ones that know the number of another agent, if ϕ0
is true then any agent who can make a call is allowed to make that call. So ϕ0 is the
first disjunct of ψij , enabling the call in stage (1).
Defining “exactly one call has been made” is a bit harder, but we can do it: after
the first call, there will be two agents that know two secrets, while everyone else only
knows one secret. So ϕ1 :=
∨
k 6=l(Skl ∧ Slk ∧
∧
m6∈{k,l}
∧
n6=m ¬Smn) holds if and only
if exactly one call has been made. In that case, any agent that is capable of making
calls and only knows their own secret is allowed to make a call, so ϕ1 ∧∧k 6=i ¬Sik is
the second disjunct of ψij , enabling the call in stage (2).
In stage (3), the second caller is supposed to make another call. We make a case
distinction based on whether the first two calls were to the same agent or to different
agents. If they were to the same agent, then the second caller now knows three
different secrets: ∨k 6=i∨l 6∈{i,k} Sikl. But that holds not only for the agent who made
the second call, but also for the agent that received the second call. The difference
between them is that the secret of the receiver of this call is now known by three
agents, while the secret of the caller is known by only two: ∧k 6=i(Ski→ ∧l 6∈{i,k} ¬Sli).
If the first two calls were to different agents, the second caller knows that every
agent now knows exactly two secrets: Ki
∧
k
∨
l 6=k(Skl ∧
∧
m6∈{k,l} ¬Skm). This holds
for the receiver of the second call as well, but the difference between them is that the
number of the receiver is known to an agent who does not know their secret, while
the number of the caller is not: ∧k(Nki→ Ski).
In either case, the target of the call should be the unique agent whose number
the caller knows but whose secret the caller does not know. Since calls are always to
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an agent whose number is known, we only have to stipulate that the target’s secret
is not known. So the third disjunct of ψij is
¬Sij ∧ ((
∨
k 6=i
∨
l 6∈{i,k}
Sikl ∧
∧
k 6=i
(Ski→
∧
l 6∈{i,k}
¬Sli))∨
(Ki
∧
k
∨
l 6=k
(Skl ∧
∧
m 6∈{k,l}
¬Skm) ∧
∧
k
(Nki→ Ski))),
enabling the call in stage (3).
It is relatively easy to express when the call in stage (4) should happen: before
the third call, all agents know that there is no expert yet, while after the third
call all agents consider it possible that there is at least one expert. This can be
expressed as Kˆi
∨
k Exk. It is slightly more difficult to identify the agent who should
make the call. The agent who should make the call, the one who made the call in
stage (1), is the only agent who only knows two secrets, and whose number is only
known by agents that also know their secret. So ¬∨k 6=i∨l 6∈{i,j} Sikl∧∧k(Nki→ Ski).
Finally, the person who should be called in this stage is the unique agent of whom
the caller knows the number but not the secret. The fourth disjunct is therefore
¬Sij ∧ Kˆi∨k Exk ∧ ¬∨k 6=i∨l 6∈{i,j} Sikl ∧∧k(Nki→ Ski).
Finally, the call in stage (5) should only happen if there remains a non-expert
agent. This non-expert considers it possible that all other agents are experts, so the
final disjunct of ψij is ¬Sij ∧ Kˆi∧k 6=i Exk.
On the “diamond” graph the extension of the syntactic protocol with call condition
Pij is the semantic protocol defined above. Clearly, this protocol is symmetric. We
already showed that the protocol is epistemic as well.
All in all, this gives us the protocol that we were looking for. Manually verifying
the extension of the protocol is somewhat tedious, so we have also checked the
extension using the model checking tool described in the Appendix.
4 An Impossibility Result on Strengthening LNS
4.1 An Impossibility Result
In this section we will show that there are graphs where (i) LNS is weakly successful
and (ii) no epistemic symmetric strengthening of LNS is strongly successful. Recall
that we assume that the system is synchronous and that the initial gossip graph is
common knowledge. Without such assumptions it is even easier to obtain such an
impossibility result, a matter that we will address in the final section.
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Theorem 38. There is no epistemic symmetric protocol that is a strongly successful
strengthening of LNS on all graphs.
Proof. Consider the following “candy” graph G:
0
1 2 3 4
5
LNS is weakly successful on G, but there is no epistemic symmetric protocol P that
is a strengthening of LNS and that is strongly successful on G.
In [16], it was shown that LNS is weakly successful on any graph that is neither
a “bush” nor a “double bush”. Since this graph G is neither a bush nor a double
bush, LNS is weakly successful on it. For example, the sequence
02; 12; 53; 43; 13; 03; 23; 52; 42
is a successful LNS sequence which makes everyone an expert. LNS is not strongly
successful on this graph, however. For example,
02; 12; 53; 43; 13; 03; 52; 42
is an unsuccessful LNS sequence, because 5 learns neither the number nor the secret
of 4 and no further calls are allowed.
Now, suppose towards a contradiction that P is an epistemic symmetric strength-
ening of LNS , and that P is strongly successful on G.
Before we look at specific calls made by P , we consider a general fact. Recall that
knowing a pure number means knowing the number of an agent without knowing
their secret. For any gossip graph and any agent a, if no one has a’s pure number,
then no call sequence will result in anyone learning a’s pure number. After all, in
order to learn a’s number, one would have to call or be called by someone who
already knows that number, but in such a call one would also learn a’s secret.
In LNS , you are only allowed to call an agent if you have the number but not the
secret of that agent, i.e., if you have their pure number. It follows that if, in a given
gossip graph, no one has a’s pure number, then no LNS sequence on that graph will
contain any calls where a is the receiver.
In the gossip graph G under consideration, agents 0, 1, 4 and 5 are in the situation
that no one else knows their number. So in particular, no one knows the pure number
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of any of these agents. It follows that 2 and 3 are the only possible targets for LNS
calls in this graph.
Now, let us consider the first call according to P . This call must target 2 or 3.
The calls 12 and 43 are bad calls, since they would result in 1 (resp. 4) being unable
to make calls or be called, while still not being an expert.
This means that either 0 or 5 must make the first call. By symmetry, we can
assume without loss of generality that the first call is 02. This yields the following
situation.
0
1 2 3 4
5
Now, let us look at the next call.
• The sequence 02; 43 is bad, because that would make it impossible for 4 to ever
become an expert.
• Because of the symmetry of P , the initial call could have been 03 instead of 02.
The sequence 03; 12 is bad, since 1 cannot become an expert, so 03; 12 is not
allowed by the strongly successful protocol P .
But agent 1 cannot tell the difference between 03 and 02, so from the fact
that 03; 12 is disallowed and that P is epistemic it follows that 02; 12 is also
disallowed.
• The sequence 02; 03 is bad, since 0 will not be able to make any call afterwards.
Because 0 can also never be called, this implies that 0 will never become an
expert.
• Consider then the sequence 02; 23. This results in the following diagram.
0
1 2 3 4
5
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This graph has the following property: it is impossible (in any LNS sequence)
for any agent to get to learn a new pure number. That is, nobody can learn
a new number without also getting to know the secret of that agent: agents
1, 0, and 4 each know only one pure number, so they cannot teach anyone a
new number, and agent 5 knows two pure numbers (2 and 3), but those agents
already know each other’s secrets.
As a result, any call that will become allowed by LNS in the future is already
allowed now. There are 5 such calls that are currently allowed, namely 12, 52,
53, 03 and 43. Furthermore, of those calls 52 and 53 are mutually exclusive,
since calling 2 will teach 5 the secret of 3, and calling 3 will teach 5 the secret
of 2.
So any continuation of 02; 23 allowed by LNS can only contain (in any order)
12, 03, 43 and either 52 or 53. Since P is a strengthening of LNS , the same
holds for P . But using only those calls, there is no way to teach 3 the secret of
1: secret 1 can reach agent 2 using the call 12, but in order for the secret to
travel any further we need the call 52. After that call only 03 and 43 are still
allowed (in particular, 53 is ruled out), so the knowledge of secret 1 remains
limited to agents 1, 2 and 5.
Since 02;13 cannot be extended to a successful LNS sequence, 02;13 must be
disallowed.
• Consider the call sequence 02; 52. This gives the following diagram.
0
1 2 3 4
5
Note that in this situation, it is impossible for agents 3 and 4 to learn any
new number without also learning the secrets corresponding to those numbers:
there is no agent that knows the number of agent 3 and that also knows another
pure number, and this will remain the case whatever other calls happen.
This means that agent 3 cannot make any calls, and that agent 4 can make
exactly one call, to agent 3.
Suppose now that 02; 52 is extended to a successful LNS sequence. This
sequence has to contain the call 43 at some point. This will be the only call by
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agent 4, so in order for the sequence to be successful, agent 3 already has to
know secret 1 by the time 43 takes place.
In particular, this means that the call 12 has already happened, and that either
agent 1 or agent 2 has then called agent 3 to transmit this secret. Whichever
agent among 1 and 2 makes this call, afterwards they are unable to make any
more calls. Furthermore, this takes place before the call 43, so whatever agent
x ∈ {1, 2} informs 3 of secret 1 does not learn secret 4. Since this agent x can
neither make another call nor be called, it follows that x does not become an
expert.
So 02; 52 is not allowed by P which we assumed to be strongly successful.
• Finally, consider the call sequence 02; 53. By symmetry, 03 could have been
the first call as opposed to 02. Furthermore, the same reasoning that showed
02;52 to be unsuccessful above can, with an appropriate permutation of agents,
be used to show that 03;53 is unsuccessful.
Agent 5 cannot distinguish between the first call 02 and 03 before making the
call 53, so if 03; 53 is disallowed then so is 02; 53 because P is epistemic.
Remember that 02 is, without loss of generality, the only initial call that can
lead to success. We have shown that all of the LNS-permitted calls following the
initial call 02 (namely, the calls 43, 12, 03, 23, 52 and 53) are disallowed by P . This
contradicts P being a strongly successful strengthening of LNS .
4.2 Backward Induction and Look-Ahead applied to Candy
Given this impossibility result, it is natural to wonder what would happen if we use
the syntactic strengthenings from Definition 23, or their iterations, on the “candy”
graph G.
All second calls are eliminated by LNS, because for any two agents a and b we
have G, 02 |= ¬KLNSa [ab]〈LNS〉Ex. By symmetry this also holds for the three other
possible first calls, hence LNS is unsuccessful on G. However, the first calls are still
allowed according to LNS.
There are 9468 LNS-sequences on this graph of which 840 are successful. Using
the implementation discussed in the Appendix we found out that LNS, the soft
look-ahead strengthening of LNS , is weakly successful on this graph and allows 840
successful and 112 unsuccessful sequences.
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5 Conclusions, Comparison, and Further Research
Conclusions We modeled common knowledge of protocols in the setting of dis-
tributed dynamic gossip. A crucial role is played by the novel notion of protocol-
dependent knowledge. This knowledge is interpreted using an epistemic relation over
states in the execution tree of a gossip protocol in a given gossip graph. As the
execution tree consists of gossip states resulting from calls permitted by the protocol,
this requires a careful semantic framework.
We described various syntactically or semantically definable strengthenings of
gossip protocols, and investigated the combination and iteration of such strengthen-
ings, in view of strengthening a weakly successful protocol into one that is strongly
successful on all graphs. In the setting of gossip, a novel notion we used in such
strengthenings is that of uniform backward induction, as a variation on backward
induction in search trees and game trees.
Finally, we proved that for the LNS protocol, in which agents are only allowed
to call other agents if they do not know their secrets, it is impossible to define a
strengthening that is strongly successful on all graphs.
Comparison As already described at length in the introductory section, our work
builds upon prior work on dynamic distributed gossip [16, 15], which itself has a prior
history in the networks community [23, 29, 20] and in the logic community [3, 1].
Many aspects of gossip may or may not be common knowledge among agents: how
many agents there are, the time of a global clock, the gossip graph, etc. The
point of our result is that even under the strongest such assumptions, one can still
not guarantee that a gossip protocol always terminates successfully. How common
knowledge of agents is affected by gossip protocol execution is investigated in [2]: for
example, the authors demonstrate how sender-receiver subgroup common knowledge
is obtained (and lost) during calls. However, they do not study common knowledge
of gossip protocols. We do not know of other work on that topic. Outside the
area of gossip, protocol knowledge has been well investigated in the epistemic logic
community [26, 39, 12].
While the concept of backward induction is well-known in game theory (see for
example [4]), it is only used in perfect-information settings, where all agents know
what the real world or the actual state is. Our definition of uniform backward
induction is a generalization of backward induction to the dynamic gossip setting,
where only partial observability is assumed. A concept akin to uniform backward
induction has been proposed in [35] (rooted in [8]), under the name of common belief
in future rationality, with an accompanying recursive elimination procedure called
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backward dominance.3 As in our approach, this models a decision rule faced with
uncertainty over indistinguishable moves. In [35], the players are utility maximizers
with probabilistic beliefs, which in our setting would correspond to randomizing
over all indistinguishable moves/calls. As a decision rule this is also known as the
insufficient reason (or Laplace) criterion: all outcomes are considered equiprobable.
Seeing uniform backward induction as the combination of backward induction and
a decision rule immediately clarifies the picture. Soft uniform backward induction
applies the minimax regret criterion for the decision whom to call, minimizing the
maximum utility loss. In contrast, hard uniform backward induction applies the
maximin utility criterion, maximizing the minimum utility (also known as risk-averse,
pessimistic, or Wald criterion).
In the gossip scenario, the unique minimum value is unsuccessful termination,
and the unique maximum value is successful termination. Minimax prescribes that
as long as the agent considers it possible that a call leads to successful termination,
the agent is allowed to make the call (as long as the minimum of the maximum is
success, go for it): the soft version. Maximin prescribes that, as long as the agent
considers it possible that a call lead to unsuccessful termination, the agent should not
make the call (as long as the maximum of the minimum is failure, avoid it): the hard
version. Such decision criteria over uncertainty also crop up in areas overlapping
with social software and social choice, e.g. [7, 11, 33, 31]. In [7] a somewhat similar
concept has been called “common knowledge of stable belief in rationality”. However,
there it applies to a weaker epistemic notion, namely belief.
Further Research The impossibility result for LNS is for dynamic gossip where
agents exchange both secrets and numbers, and where the network expands. Also in
the non-dynamic setting we can quite easily find a graph where static LNS is weakly
successful but cannot be strengthened to an epistemic symmetric strongly successful
protocol. Consider again the “diamond” graph of Section 3.6, for which we described
various strongly successful strengthenings. Also in “static” gossip LNS is weakly
successful on this graph, since 01; 30; 20; 31 is successful. All four possible first calls
are symmetric. After 21, the remaining possible calls are 20, 31 and 30. But 20 is
bad, since 2 will never learn secret 3 that way. Also 31 is bad, since agent 1 will
never learn the secret of 0. The call 30 is safe and in fact guarantees success, but by
epistemic symmetry it cannot be allowed while 31 is disallowed. Therefore, in the
static setting it is impossible to strengthen LNS on “diamond” such that it becomes
strongly successful. We expect a completely different picture for strengthening “static”
gossip protocols in similar fashion as we did here, for dynamic gossip.
3We kindly thank Andrés Perea for his interactions.
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We assumed synchronicity (a global clock) and common knowledge of the initial
gossip graph. These strong assumptions were made on purpose, because without
them agents will have even less information available and will therefore not be able to
coordinate any better. Such and other parameters for gossip problems are discussed
in [13]. It is unclear what results still can be obtained under fully distributed
conditions, where agents only know their own history of calls and their neighbors.
We wish to determine the logic of protocol-dependent knowledge KPa , and also on
fully distributed gossip protocols, without a global clock, and to further generalize
this beyond the setting of gossip.
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Appendix: A Model Checker for Dynamic Gossip
Analyzing examples of gossip graphs and their execution trees by hand is tedious.
To help us find and check the examples in this paper we wrote a Haskell program
which is available at https://github.com/m4lvin/gossip. Our program can show
and randomly generate gossip graphs, execute the protocols we discussed and draw
the resulting execution trees with epistemic edges. The program also includes an
epistemic model checker for the formal language we introduced, similar to DEMO [17],
but tailor-made for dynamic gossip. For further details, see also [19, Section 6.6].
Figure 2 is an example output of the implementation, showing the execution tree
for Example 30 up to two calls, together with the epistemic edges for agent 2, here
called c. Note that we use a more compact way to denote gossip graphs: lower case
stands for a pure number and capital letters for knowing the number and secret.
AbCD.B.AC.AbCD
AC.aBD.AC.aBD
c
AC.B.AC.abD
da
db ABD.ABD.aC.AbD
AbD.ABD.aC.ABD
c
ABD.ABD.aC.aBD
c
ABD.aBD.aC.ABD
cc
c
c
AbCD.B.AbCD.AbD
AbD.B.aC.AbD
ab
db
ca
A.aBD.aC.aBD
c
ba
da
AC.aBD.AC.aBD
ca
A.B.aC.abD
ca da db
Figure 2: Two levels of the execution tree for Example 30, with epistemic edges for c.
Our implementation can run different protocols on a given graph and output a
LATEX table showing and comparing the extension of those protocols. Tables 2 and 3
have been generated in this way. They provide details how various strengthenings
behave on the gossip graphs from Example 30 and Section 3.6.
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LNS · · · ·2 ·3 ·4 ·♦ ·♦2 ·♦3 ·♦4 ·♦5
 ×
20 × ×
20;30 × ×
20;30;01 × ×
20;30;01;31 ×
20;30;31 × ×
20;30;31;01 ×
20;31 × ×
20;31;10 × ×
20;31;10;30 ×
20;31;30 × ×
20;31;30;10 ×
30 × ×
30;01 ×
30;01;20 ×
30;01;20;31 × × × × × ×
30;01;31 × × × × × ×
30;01;31;20 ×
30;20;01 ×
30;20;01;21;31 X X X X X X X X
30;20;01;31;21 X X X X X X X
30;20;21 ×
30;20;21;01;31 X X X X X X X X
30;20;21;31;01 X X X X X X X
30;20;31;01 ×
30;20;31;01;21 × × × × × ×
30;20;31;21 ×
30;20;31;21;01 × × × × × ×
30;31 ×
30;31;01 × ×
30;31;01;20 ×
30;31;20 × × × ×
30;31;20;01 × ×
30;31;20;01;21 ×
30;31;20;21 × ×
30;31;20;21;01 ×
31 ×
31;10 ×
31;10;20 × × × × × ×
31;10;20;30 ×
31;10;30 × ×
31;10;30;20 ×
31;20 × × × × ×
31;20;10 × ×
31;20;10;30 ×
31;20;30 × ×
31;20;30;10 ×
31;30 ×
31;30;10 × ×
31;30;10;20 ×
31;30;20 × × × × × ×
31;30;20;10 ×
Table 2: N Example 30: Extensions of strengthenings.
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LNS · (·) · · ·2 ·3 ·4 ·♦ ·♦2 ·♦3 (·♦)3
 ×
01 ×
01;21 × × × ×
01;21;30 ×
01;21;31 ×
01;30 ×
01;30;21 × × × ×
01;31 ×
01;31;21 × × × ×
21 ×
21;01 × × × ×
21;01;30 ×
21;01;31 ×
21;30 × ×
21;30;01 × ×
21;30;01;31 ×
21;30;31 × ×
21;30;31;01 ×
21;31 ×
21;31;01 × × × ×
30 × ×
30;01 × ×
30;01;21;31 X X X X X
30;01;31;21 X X X X X X X
30;21;01 ×
30;21;01;31 × × × × ×
30;21;31 ×
30;21;31;01 × × × × ×
30;31 × ×
30;31;01;21 X X X X X X X
30;31;21;01 X X X X X
31;01;21;30 X X X X X
31;01;30;21 X X X X X X
31;10;21;30 X X X X X
31;10;30;21 X X X X X X X X X X X
31;21;01;30 X X X X X
31;21;30 X X X X X X
31;30;10;21 X X X X X X X X X X X
31;30;21 X X X X X
Table 3: Diamond Example of Section 3.6: Extensions of strengthenings, after 20.
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